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Author SHA1 Message Date
Cursor AgentandAbimael Martell 8c3e07a491 Make Bugcrowd the preferred reporting channel
Bugcrowd's disclosure engagement is the primary channel; email to
help@firecrawl.dev is offered as the alternative.

Co-authored-by: Abimael Martell <abimaelmartell@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 18:08:35 +00:00
Cursor AgentandAbimael Martell 056a77b82d Update SECURITY.md reporting channels
Clarify that email is the only required channel and point the
alternative at Firecrawl's Bugcrowd disclosure engagement instead of
the private-advisory link, which is not enabled on this repo.

Co-authored-by: Abimael Martell <abimaelmartell@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 18:01:28 +00:00
69039f2728 Fix char-boundary panic in hex_to_unicode_string (#320)
Use hex.get(i..i+2) instead of &hex[i..i+2] so a non-hex, non-ASCII
destination in a /ToUnicode CMap can no longer trigger a UTF-8
char-boundary panic. An even byte length does not guarantee the byte
offset falls on a char boundary; get() returns None on a non-boundary
or out-of-range index, folding cleanly into the existing flow.

Add regression tests covering a multi-byte destination char and a
replacement-char byte.

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Abimael Martell <abimaelmartell@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 08:21:31 -07:00
3cca6446bd fix(glyph_names): handle non-ASCII input in uniXXXX glyph name parsing (#321)
Use str::get instead of a byte-length check plus slice when parsing the
uniXXXX glyph-name form. The byte-length guard only proved the index was
in bounds, not on a UTF-8 char boundary, so a glyph name containing
non-ASCII bytes could cause a slice on a non-boundary index. Switch to a
checked slice that folds into the existing Option flow, and add tests.

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Abimael Martell <abimaelmartell@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 08:21:22 -07:00
3 changed files with 63 additions and 7 deletions
+4 -3
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@@ -5,14 +5,15 @@
If you believe you've found a security vulnerability in pdf-inspector, please
report it privately so we can fix it before public disclosure.
**Preferred:** Email **help@firecrawl.dev** with:
**Preferred:** Submit through Firecrawl's Bugcrowd vulnerability disclosure
program at <https://bugcrowd.com/engagements/firecrawl-vdp-ess>. Please include:
- A description of the issue and its impact
- Steps to reproduce (a minimal PDF or input that triggers the bug is ideal)
- The version or commit hash of pdf-inspector you tested against
**Alternative:** Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting under the
[Security tab](https://github.com/firecrawl/pdf-inspector/security/advisories/new).
**Alternative:** If you'd rather not use Bugcrowd, email
**help@firecrawl.dev** with the same details.
We'll acknowledge your report in a timely manner and keep you updated on
remediation progress. Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security
+40 -3
View File
@@ -4566,9 +4566,13 @@ pub fn glyph_to_char(name: &str) -> Option<char> {
}
}
// Try to parse uniXXXX format
if name.starts_with("uni") && name.len() >= 7 {
if let Ok(code) = u32::from_str_radix(&name[3..7], 16) {
// Try to parse uniXXXX format.
// Use `get` rather than a byte-length check + slice: `name` can contain
// non-ASCII bytes (e.g. U+FFFD from lossy UTF-8 decoding of an attacker
// controlled /Differences name), so byte index 7 may not be a char
// boundary and `&name[3..7]` would panic.
if let Some(hex) = name.strip_prefix("uni").and_then(|rest| rest.get(..4)) {
if let Ok(code) = u32::from_str_radix(hex, 16) {
// Strip PUA F000 offset: uniF0XX → U+00XX (Windows Symbol encoding convention)
let code = if (0xF000..=0xF0FF).contains(&code) {
code - 0xF000
@@ -4588,3 +4592,36 @@ pub fn glyph_to_char(name: &str) -> Option<char> {
None
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn uni_hex_parsing() {
assert_eq!(glyph_to_char("uni0041"), Some('A'));
assert_eq!(glyph_to_char("uni00e9"), Some('\u{00e9}'));
// PUA F0xx symbol-encoding offset is stripped.
assert_eq!(glyph_to_char("uniF041"), Some('A'));
}
#[test]
fn u_hex_parsing() {
assert_eq!(glyph_to_char("u0041"), Some('A'));
assert_eq!(glyph_to_char("u1F600"), Some('\u{1F600}'));
}
#[test]
fn non_ascii_uni_name_does_not_panic() {
// A crafted /Differences name like `/uni#80#80#80#80` decodes via
// from_utf8_lossy into "uni" followed by four U+FFFD replacements.
// Byte index 7 lands mid-character, so a naive `&name[3..7]` slice
// would panic. It must be handled gracefully instead.
let crafted = format!("uni{0}{0}{0}{0}", '\u{FFFD}');
assert_eq!(glyph_to_char(&crafted), None);
// Assorted non-ASCII bytes right after the "uni" prefix.
assert_eq!(glyph_to_char("uni\u{FFFD}bc"), None);
assert_eq!(glyph_to_char("uni\u{00e9}00"), None);
}
}
+19 -1
View File
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ fn hex_to_unicode_string(hex: &str) -> Option<String> {
let bytes: Option<Vec<u8>> = (0..hex.len())
.step_by(2)
.map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&hex[i..i + 2], 16).ok())
.map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(hex.get(i..i + 2)?, 16).ok())
.collect();
let bytes = bytes?;
@@ -2606,6 +2606,24 @@ endcmap
assert_eq!(cmap.lookup(0x0025), Some("B".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn test_hex_to_unicode_non_ascii_no_panic() {
// A destination containing a multi-byte char makes the byte length even
// while a byte offset can land inside a char. Slicing must not panic;
// it should be rejected gracefully.
assert_eq!(hex_to_unicode_string("XéY"), None);
assert_eq!(hex_to_unicode_string("\u{fffd}0"), None);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_bfchar_non_ascii_destination_no_panic() {
// Crafted /ToUnicode CMap: a non-hex, non-ASCII destination previously
// triggered a char-boundary panic in hex_to_unicode_string.
let cmap_content = "beginbfchar <0041> <XéY> endbfchar";
// Must not panic; the malformed entry is simply skipped.
let _ = ToUnicodeCMap::parse(cmap_content.as_bytes());
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_bfchar_1byte() {
// This is the pattern that caused the CJK bug: codespace is <0000><FFFF>